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LAW REVIEW
CHARLES R. O'KELLEY, JR.*
The Parenting Tax Penalty: A
Framework for Income Tax
Reform
T he Internal Revenue Code contains four principal mecha-
nisms intended to achieve an equitable allocation of tax bur-
dens among taxpayers with different family and employment re-
sponsibilities. These devices are: (1) the personal exemption;' (2)
the separate income tax rate structures for married individuals,'
unmarried individuals,3 and heads of households;4 (3) the tax
credit for certain employment-related childcare expenses;5 and (4)
the deduction for two-worker married couples.' In this Article I
work out the implications of my intuition that, despite this impres-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Oregon. B.A. 1970, University of
the South; J.D. 1972, University of Texas at Austin; LL.M. 1977, Harvard
University.
' I.R.C. § 151 (1984).
Id. § l(a).
* Id. § 1(c).
Id. § 1(b).
6Id. §21.
Id. §221.
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sive array of tax provisions, the present federal income tax system
discriminates7 against taxpayers with dependent children by fail-
ing to take into account the negative income generated by parent-
ing. In the process of so doing, this Article further develops a the-
ory of income taxation consistent with the accretion definition of
income8 and sets forth a coherent framework for determining the
fair relative tax burdens of parents and nonparents.
Implicit in any tax reform proposal is a theory of legal change
which explains why and under what conditions Congress will re-
spond favorably to the measures advocated. 9 My working hypothe-
sis is that Congress only enacts laws that are to some extent con-
sistent with society's governing beliefs about what is just.'0 Thus,
a tax reform proposal may be labeled "good" if it is more consis-
tent with governing social beliefs than is the existing tax regime."
Part I considers the proper tax treatment of out-of-pocket
parenting expenses such as the costs incurred in providing food,
clothing, shelter, and other goods and services to chidren for their
consumption. Part I first characterizes the principal design alter-
natives to the present flat dependency deduction. It then examines
the dominant accretion definition of income and concludes that
the current flat dependency deduction is more consistent with the
accretion concept and our actual governing beliefs than is any of
the alternatives advocated by its critics.
Part II considers the tax relevance of imputed income from self-
performed services. It explains: (1) how the positive imputed in-
come from household production should be taxed; and (2) the ex-
" What I mean by this is that the present tax treatment of parents is unjustifi-
able given the theory of proper treatment developed in this Article. For a similar
use of the term "discrimination" see O'Fa~lon, The Commerce Clause: A Theo-
retical Comment, 61 OR. L. REv. 395, 4124(1982).
8 This Article is in some respects an extension of arguments about the accre-
tion concept of income contained in O'Kelley, Tax Policy for Post-Liberal Soci-
ety: A Flat- Tax-Inspired Redefinition of the Purpose and Ideal Structure of a
Progressive Income Tax, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 727 (1985).
1 This would not be true if the reformer contemplated violent change.
10 O'Kelley, supra note 8, at 735.
1 1 am distinguishing between scholarship designed to identify changes that
would bring social institutions more into accord with existing social beliefs and
scholarship implicitly or explicitly advocating fundamental change in governing
social beliefs. Proposals of the latter type have little relevance to those interested
in current tax policy because Congress will not enact legislation which is incon-
sistent with existing governing beliefs. On the possibility of peacefully changing
basic social beliefs see O'Kelley, Rawls, Justice, and the Income Tax, 16 GA. L.
REV. 1, 16-32 (1981); Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of
the First Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 316-21 (1982).
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tent to which a parent's childcare obligations constitute negative
imputed income. Part II concludes that the present income tax
system discriminates against all parents by failing to allow a de-
duction for the negative income produced by parenting and dis-
criminates against two-worker married couples by failing to allow
a more generous deduction for employment-related childcare
expenses.
I
THE CASE FOR A FLAT DEPENDENCY DEDUCTION
A. The Flat Dependency Deduction and Ability to Pay
Since 1917 the Internal Revenue Code has authorized a depen-
dency deduction which does not vary in amount to reflect a tax-
payer's income level or actual parenting expenditures." Currently
the dependency deduction is $1000 per child.13 The existing flat
dependency deduction is usually defended by reference to the
"ability to pay" maxim. 4 Tax, it is argued, cannot be paid out of
income which does not exceed the subsistence level.' 6 Therefore, a
flat dependency deduction is necessary to exempt from tax the
cost of providing basic necessities to a child. Amounts spent in
excess of the flat dependency deduction are discretionary personal
consumption expenses and should be taxed.16 However, it is
equally plausible to argue that the impact of family responsibili-
ties on taxpaying capacity declines as income rises. Under this in-
S See Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV.
1389, 1444-45 (1975); H. GROVES, FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF THE FAMILY
18-20 (1963).
Is What I call the dependency deduction is the additional personal exemption
available to a taxpayer for each qualifying dependent I.R.C. § 151(e) (1984).
The term "dependent" is defined in I.R.C. § 152 (1984) and may include individ-
uals other than children. However, this Article is concerned only with the proper
tax treatment of dependent chldren. Under I.R.C. § 151(0 (1984) the exemption
amount is set at $1,000. For tax years beginning after December 31, 1984 the
exemption amount is adjusted annually to reflect increases in the cost-of-living.
Id. For simplicity this Article will consider the current dependency deduction to
be $1,000.
14 1 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY,
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 66 (1984) [hereinafter cited as U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY]; J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 74 (3d ed. 1977).
15 H. GROVES, supra note 12, at 23-24.
is Brannon and Morss, The Tax Allowance for Dependents: Deductions Ver-
sus Credits, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 599, 602-03 (1973).
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terpretation the dependency deduction should decrease as income
increases, and at some point vanish.17
Because the "ability to pay" maxim is inherently ambiguous it
provides an unsatisfactory justification for a flat dependency de-
duction.18 This section examines the relationship of parenting ex-
penses and the income tax and develops a coherent theoretical jus-
tification for the flat dependency deduction.
B. THE OTHER TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS ABOUT CHILDREN
There are three significant theories as to the proper tax treat-
ment of parenting expenses. 19
1. Children as Parental Investments
Children are often described as a form of parental investment
intended to insure that parents will be cared for financially and
otherwise in the event of disability or old age. Parenting expenses
are incurred to create and foster these investment assets. Thus,
parenting costs are analogous to capital expenses and should be
nondeductible.2 0
This argument raises no serious tax policy questions. Viewing
parenting costs as capital investments requires a determination
that these expenses create an asset-children with good will to-
ward their parents-which has a useful life of more than one
year. 2 1 Common experience suggests, however, that a child's long-
term love and respect for his or her parents is a product of the
love and respect extended by the parents to the child rather than a
17 R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 218-19 (1976).
18 For a scathing criticism of the "ability to pay" maxim, see H. SIMONS, PER-
SONAL INCOME TAXATION 17 (1938). See also O'Kelley, supra note 8, at 745,
Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE
L.J. 1081, 1092-93 (1980).
19 This Article is not concerned with arguments that the dependency deduc-
tion should be replaced by a tax credit in order to subsidize poor families. Such
suggestions belong in the arena of welfare policy rather than tax design. The
primary question is whether the subsidy is desirable. Whether the income tax is
the preferable mechanism for accomplishing a desired subsidy is a secondary
question relating to efficiency criteria rather than to tax policy principles. See
e.g., Brazer, The Federal Income Tax and the Poor: Where Do We Go From
Here?, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 422 (1969).
20 Bittker, supra note 12, at 1447-48.
11 Of course investments in human capital are, generally, neither currently
deductible or amortizable. For a general discussion, see Stephan, Federal Income
Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L. REV. 1357 (1984).
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function of the amount of money spent on the child. If any affec-
tion or respect is obtained in return for parenting expenses, it is
likely to be acquired in an immediate exchange. Thus, if there is a
basis for viewing parenting expenses as the "quid" in a parent-
child exchange, the "quo" is current psychic income from affec-
tion and respect tendered by the child, rather than expected future
services." Accordingly, the view that children are parental invest-
ments is counterfaotual and without relevance in the tax policy
arena.
2. Children as Parental Consumption
A second theory views chidren as items of personal consump-
tion. One form of this argument begins with the proposition that
for any given taxpayer the decision to procreate is voluntary. In
choosing to procreate parents necessarily elect to incur the future
costs associated with parenting. A second version of this theory
places no emphasis on the original decision to procreate, but, in-
stead, characterizes parenting expenses as the product of ongoing
parental consumption choices. Under either view, parenting costs
are just another type of nondeductible personal consumption
expenditure.2 3
3. Parenting Expenses as the Income of Children
Diametrically opposed to the above theories which treat chil-
dren as items of investment or nondeductible consumption is the
view that all parenting expenses should be deductible. Proponents
justify this position on the basis that income should be taxed to
the person consuming it who, in the case of parenting expenses, is
the child. 4
C. The Underlying Conflict
The "children as nondeductible items of personal consumption"
theory implicitly relies on the accretion definition of income, and
on the view that parenting expenses constitute personal consump-
,' Viewed as current expenditures, the case for deductibility turns on a choice
between the accretion and consumption definitions as discussed in infra I(D).
s H. SIMONS, supra note 18, at 139-40; Bittker, supra note 12, at 1445-47.
24 Bittker, supra note 12, at 1448-49; McIntyre and Oldman, Taxation of the
Family in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1573, 1602-07 (1977).
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tion by the parents. The "full deductibility of parenting expenses"
theory is either an application of the consumption definition of in-
come or relies on the theory that money spent on children is not
parental income even under the accretion definition. Under the ac-
cretion concept, income should be taxed whether spent or saved,
and personal consumption expenditures are not deductible. Under
the consumption ideal only the actual consumer of income is
taxed. Accordingly, the proper treatment of parenting expenses
depends on a choice between the accretion and consumption defi-
nitions of income, and on a determination of the extent to which
parenting expenses may be properly characterized as the personal
consumption of parents or, instead, of the child benefiting from
the expenditure.
D. The Accretion and Consumption Definitions of Income
The accretion definition of income continues to dominate tax
policy debate. The leading expression of the accretion concept is
the Haig-Simons definition:
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the
market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change
in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning
and end of the period in question. In other words, it is merely the
result obtained by adding consumption during the period to
.wealth" at the end of the period and then substracting "wealth"
at the beginning."
Analysis of the arguments concerning proper treatment of
parenting expenses reveals an ambiguity in this definition. It is
unclear what constitutes exercise of a consumption right. Suppose
A earns $10,000 and gives $5,000 of her earnings to B, who
spends it. Does A have $5,000 in psychic income which is realized
upon giving the gift? Should we view B as merely the agent
through whom A exercises the consumption right? Instead, does A
avoid tax on the gift because income arises only when one person-
ally exercises a consumption right? Without clarifying this ambi-
guity about the meaning of "rights exercised in consumption," ap-
peal to the Haig-Simons definition does not produce a clear
answer to the question of whether or not parenting expenses
should be deducted.26
" H. SIMONS, supra note 18, at 50.
's Traditionally, advocates of a comprehensive tax base rest their case on the
Haig-Simons definition of income. E.g., see Musgrave, In Defense of an Income
[Vol. 64, 1986]
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It is unlikely that those opposing deductibility of parenting ex-
penses believe in psychic income or view parents as agents of their
children's consumption. Instead, their position is based on a differ-
ent articulation of the accretion concept; namely, income equals
the value of consumption rights earned during the year, whether
spent or saved.27 Parenting expenses are nondeductible under the
accretion definition because they have no relevance to a determi-
nation of the amount of consumption rights earned by parents
during the tax year.
In direct opposition to the accretion definition is the view that
income should be defined as the market value of consumption
rights personally exercised. Under this definition of income,
parenting expenses are deductible by parents and are included in
the income of the child benefited.2 8
The dispute between those favoring deductibility of all parent-
ing expenses and those opposing any deduction can now be seen to
involve markedly different views of the purpose of the income tax.
Under the accretion definition it is critical that the earner of in-
come be taxed, while under the consumption definition determin-
ing the earner of consumption rights is irrelevant. Present law re-
flects the accretion-based concern that the earner of income be
taxed. For example, a donor is not allowed a tax deduction for
gifts.2 1 Moreover, a taxpayer may not anticipatorily assign income
to a family member in a lower tax bracket.30 In contrast, under
Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44, 47-49 (1967). For a discussion of some of the
normative deficiencies of the Haig-Simons definitions, see Bittker, A "Compre-
hensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARv. L. REV. 925
(1967).
'7 This definition is an improvement over the Haig-Simons definition because
it makes a normative judgment about who should be taxed. In contrast, the
Haig-Simons definition is ambiguous. Most scholars interpret it as neutral to-
ward a determination of the proper taxpayer. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 26, at
974-77; Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 63, 65-66 (1967). But see McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 24, at 1576-
78.
28 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 103-04
(1977); McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 24, at 1602-07.
'9 Until recently most mainstream tax scholars assumed the nondeductibility
of gifts. The only real question was whether a gift should also be included in the
taxable income of the donee. See, e.g., H. SIMONS, supra note 18 at 56-58;
Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform. Including Gifts and Bequests in
Income, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1177 (1978).
so Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S.
112 (1940); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S.
I I 1 (1930); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930). For a suggested solution to
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the consumption definition of income a donor should be allowed a
deduction for ordinary gifts and for anticipatorily assigned in-
come.31 This dissonance between present law and the consumption
definition indicates that the consumption concept is inconsistent
with our underlying governing beliefs about what is just and, ac-
cordingly, is an inappropriate theoretical base for tax reform.3 1
Therefore, determination of the proper treatment of parenting ex-
penses requires an elaboration of the dominant accretion concept.
E. The Purpose of the Income Tax Under the Accretion
Concept
The purpose of the income tax and the dominance of the accre-
tion ideal can be explained in terms of a hypothetical social con-
tract3 which is consistent with our society's actual governing be-
liefs.-4 Assume self-interested autonomous individuals A and B
decide to form a new society ("Nirvana"). The purpose of this
social union is to provide a framework within which each citizen
may use his or her talents in coordination with others to produce a
greater total output of goods and services than would result from
continued, uncoordinated effort in a state of nature. The citizens
of Nirvana also realize that public goods,3 " such as roads and po-
lice protection, can be provided most efficiently through coopera-
the continuing problem of income shifting to lower tax bracket family members,
see McMahon, Expanding the Taxable Unit: The Aggregation of the Income of
Children and Parents, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60 (1981).
1' Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV.
309, 348-51 (1972); 1 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 14, at 193.
3' Gunn, The Case for an Income Tax, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 370, 377 (1979). A
fuller account of the case for and against the consumption ideal is beyond the
scope of this Article. For a list of references on this subject, see Warren, supra
note 18.
13 For a more elaborate account of the hypothetical social contract described
in this subsection, see O'Kelley, supra note 8, at 739-55.
4 1 am using a hypothetical state of nature as a device to develop arguments
and ideological myths which I believe capture the ordinary citizen's sense of jus-
tice. This endeavor has its analogues in John Rawls' use of the "original posi-
tion" device to justify the difference principle, J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
118-83 (1971), and in Robert Nozick's use of a theoretical state of nature to
justify libertarian principles, R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 277-94
(1974).
11 A good is a "public good" if it is capable of being used simultaneously by
many citizens without reducing the amount available for use by others. A. AL-
CHIAN AND W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE & PRODUCTION 100-01 (3d ed. 1983). Dupli-
cative production of a public good is wasteful.
[Vol. 64, 1986]
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tive effort. Each citizen, therefore, agrees to devote an equal
amount of time to the coordinated provision of these services.3 6
For illustrative purposes assume individuals A and B represent
the citizens of Nirvana. Prior to forming Nirvana, A and B each
separately produced 50 ears of corn while laboring 30 hours per
week. Both A and B also spent 30 hours per week providing them-
selves with police protection, roads, and other public goods. After
forming Nirvana A and B are able to produce 100 ears of corn,
while each spending only 25 hours per week in the corn. fields.
Moreover, A and B are able to produce needed public goods while
each laboring only 25 hours per week. Both A and B remain enti-
tled to the product of their individual labor. Because A and B
make equally valuable contributions to the production of the total
social product, each receives 50 ears of corn as compensation for
services. The public goods produced by A and B are, of course,
available for use by all citizens without charge.3 7
Nirvana's citizens soon realize that further efficiency gains can
be obtained by having some of Nirvana's citzens specialize in pub-
lic goods production while others specialize in private goods pro-
duction. Accordingly, A specializes in private goods production
and B in public goods production." A now can produce 100 ears
of corn by laboring 40 hours per week-10 hours less than A's
total labor time when working in a less specialized manner. In 40
hours per week, B now can produce the same amount of public
goods that previously required 50 hours of combined work by A
and B. Both A and B have reduced their labor time by 10 hours
and are, thus, better off as as result of their increased specializa-
tion. A and B continue to receive 50 ears of corn each, represent-
ing the value of their equal contributions to the total social prod-
uct. A has no claim to more than 50 ears of corn, even though A's
labor directly produced 100 ears, because 50 ears are traceable to
the public service time which A owed to society. Likewise B has a
moral claim to 50 ears of corn because this amount represents the
31 Alan Gunn interprets the "ability to pay" maxim and the accretion concept
in terms of the requirement that each citizen contribute an equal proportion of
his or her income producing efforts to the government. Gunn, supra note 32, at
384-86. But see Kelman, Time Preference and Tax Equity, 35 STAN. L. REV.
649, 667 n.45 (1983).
"7 Each citizen is morally entitled to the product of his or her own labor. Pub-
lic goods are the product of public service time. In effect each citizen earns a
right to use public goods in common with others without further charge.
" A and B are, respectively, representative of all members of the private and
public sector.
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value of B's private production time which B has agreed to devote
to public goods production thereby enabling all Nirvana's citizens
to realize efficiency gains from greater work specialization.
Now let us consider what happens when Nirvana begins to use
a free market and money as a medium of exchange. A continues
to produce 100 ears of corn which has a market value of $100.
Accordingly, A will receive a gross income of $100 for his produc-
tion efforts. A has no claim to $50 of this gross income because it
represents the value of the public service time which A owes to
Nirvana. Therefore, Nirvana uses a 50 percent income tax to ex-
tract from A the value of his public service time. The $50 in tax
revenue is then used to compensate B for the deemed value of B's
contribution to the total social product-the deemed value of the
private production time which B has agreed to forego.
The accretion definition relies, then, on a particular vision of
the nature of society and the relationship between government and
citizen. The purpose of the income tax is to extract the value of
the equal public service time which all citizens owe to society. 9
At the same time, the income tax identifies the value of each citi-
zen's private production time-the portion of gross income which
each citizen is morally entitled to consume. To accomplish this
purpose, each citizen's tax liability must be based on the con-
sumption rights which he or she earns.
Personal consumption expenditures are not relevant to a deter-
mination of the amount of consumption rights earned by a worker
and should have no role to play in the calculation of taxable in-
come. Accordingly, even if children are characterized as the ac-
tual consumers of parenting expenses, the accretion concept pre-
cludes any deduction for voluntary, nonbusiness expenses.
Deductibility of parenting expenses turns, then, on the applicabil-
ity of the forced consumption doctrine.
" Basing the accretion concept on each citizen's deemed responsibility to con-
tribute equal amounts of public service time might seem to dictate a pure propor-
tional or flat rate income tax. See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 36. However, this
view overlooks the possibility that graduated rates and the personal exemption
are necessary to correct for market-dictated overvaluation of the contributions of
high income taxpayers and undervaluation of low-income taxpayers. In other
words, graduated rates and the personal exemption recognize that the value of
low-income taxpayers has been partially appropriated by high-income taxpayers.
Therefore, equal contribution of time to public service requires high-income tax-
payers to pay a greater proportion of their market incomes to the government
than do lower income taxpayers. See O'Kelley, supra note 8, at 744-55, 750
n.64.
[Vol. 64, 19861
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E. Parenting Expenses as Forced Consumption
1. The Forced Consumption Doctrine
The accretion concept precludes a deduction for personal con-
sumption expenditures, ordinary gifts, or anticipatorily assigned
income. However, the exclusion from income of certain items of
forced consumption is consistent with the accretion concept. One
example of this in our income tax system is the exclusion from
gross income of meals and lodging provided to employees for the
convenience of the employer.4 Consider a firefighter who, while
on duty, must eat and sleep at the firehouse.' 1 The meals and
lodging consumed have a fair market value, but in no real sense
constitute compensation for services. The firefighter must main-
tain lodging facilities elsewhere. If he or she has a family the
preparation of family meals will continue in his or her absence at
little or no reduction in cost. 2 The food and lodging may have a
substantial fair market value to a tourist visiting the firefighter's
city, but no fair market value to the firefighter. Given a choice the
firefighter might gladly live and eat at home and commute to the
firehouse. The absence of free choice removes our normal ability
to assume that a consumption choice has value to a given taxpayer
equal to its potential value in the market. 4' Therefore, items of
forced consumption are treated as if they had never been received
by the taxpayer.
The deductibility of medical expenses4" is also explained by the
forced consumption exception to the accretion definition. Medical
expenses are incurred because of illness, injury, or for diagnostic
or preventive measures made necessary by the legitimate fear of
illness or injury; they are not voluntarily incurred.' Moreover,
40 I.R.C. § 119 (1984). For a history and criticism of § 119, see Kragen and
Speer, I.R.C. Section 119: Is Convenience of the Employer a. Valid Concept, 29
HASTINGS L.J. 921 (1978).
"I For two recent cases applying I.R.C. § 119 in the firehouse setting, see Sibla
v. Comm'r, 611 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1980); Duggan v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 911
(1981).
42 Even critics of excluding meals and lodging from gross income recognize
this point. See, e.g., Bittker, The Individual as Wage Earner, 11 INST. ON FED.
TAX'N 1147, 1153-54 (1953).
48 This point is made more generally by Henry Simons with respect to income
in kind. H. SIMONS, supra note 18, at 53. See also M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 18-20 (4th ed. 1985).
.4 I.R.C. § 213 (1984).
41 Present law can be criticized to the extent that voluntary medical expenses
are deductible. For example, a face-lift required only by personal vanity cannot
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medical expenses (if successful) only return the taxpayer to a
state of good health that other taxpayers enjoy without expense.46
From this perspective, medical expenses have zero value because,
given a choice, any taxpayer would prefer to avoid the medical
condition which necessitates the expenditure.4
Parenting expenses, too, should be deductible from gross income
to the extent they constitute items of forced consumption. How-
ever, it is here that arguments based on the voluntary nature of
procreation have their greatest force. Each citizen chooses
whether or not to become a parent. 48 Those who become parents
do so knowing full well the economic consequences of that deci-
sion. Under this view parenting expenses cannot properly be char-
acterized as involuntary in nature.
This "children as voluntary consumption" argument is unper-
suasive because it could be made with respect to any form of
forced consumption. The recipient of meals and lodging provided
for the convenience of the employer voluntarily accepted or con-
tinued employment knowing the conditions imposed by the em-
ployer. A person injured in a car wreck voluntarily chose to drive
thereby creating the possibility of injury. A person hospitalized
with influenza voluntarily chose to live in a climate where such
was likely to occur, or voluntarily came in contact with other peo-
ple likely to transmit the disease.
Consider, for example, the persuasiveness of the following pol-
icy argument: Some people do not drive cars or use any means of
public transportation because of the risks involved. Instead, they
find housing adjacent to their place of work. Because some tax-
be justified under the forced consumption analysis, yet it is deductible. Rev. Rul.
76-332, 1976-2 CB 81. Likewise, a vasectomy is a matter of personal choice. The
medical expenses incurred do not return the patient to an original state of good
health. Instead they are analogous to ordinary market purchases of personal con-
sumption items. But see Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 CB 140 (deductibility of va-
sectomy and abortion expenses).
" Thus, medical expenses are different than items of forced consumption such
as food, clothing, and shelter because every taxpayer must incur these costs.
' Put another way, medical expenses do not constitute personal consumption,
and, accordingly, are not income within the accretion definition. Under this view
the medical expense deduction is not a tax expenditure, but, instead a necessary
mechanism for correctly measuring income. Andrews, supra note 31, at 309-43
(1972). But see Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly
in an 'Ideal' Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World,
31 STAN L. REV. 831 (1979).
48 All adults through natural parenting or adoption can become a parent if
they so choose.
[Vol. 64, 1986]
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payers choose to arrange their lives to avoid the risk of automobile
and similar transportation accidents, those who voluntarily expose
themselves to such risks should not be allowed a deduction for
resulting medical expenses. Surely, this argument would not be
taken seriously.
The forced consumption doctrine does not depend on whether a
particular taxpayer theoretically could have avoided the situation
resulting in forced consumption. Some will take the jobs in which
accepting meals and lodging on the business premises is a require-
ment for continued employment. Some will drive cars and suffer
injuries. Some will have children. All of these occurrences are in-
evitable and expected. Society as we know it would be impossible
if no one drove a car or if no one had children. The voluntary
nature of procreation is, therefore, irrelevant to a determination of
the extent to which parenting expenses are involuntary within the
meaning of the forced consumption doctrine. Instead, it is neces-
sary to evaluate parenting expenses in light of the relative rights,
duties, and responsibilities of parents and society.
2. Characterizing Parenting Expenses
In a social system characterized by parental autocracy, the
family is an autonomous unit and parents are its sovereign. Par-
ents have total authority over, and responsibility for, minor chil-
dren. Parents make all decisions about the child's environment
and bear all costs associated with raising the child. Indeed, par-
ents have the right to decide whether their child lives or dies."
Therefore, under a regime of parental autocracy, parenting ex-
penses must be viewed as voluntarily incurred and nondeductible.
In our society the family is a basic social institution having as
one of its principal functions childrearing. Parents have the right
to determine most aspects of a child's environment, including the
child's education, food, clothing, religious training, and other ex-
periences. However, unlike a pure parental autocracy, the rights
of parents can be limited or terminated by the state to prevent
19 1 use the term parental autocracy to refer to a family headed by a single
individual, or by married or unmarried individuals of the same or different sex.
In actual human history parental autocracy generally took the form of patriarchy
with the man having rights of life and death over both his wife and children. See
F. ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE STATE
120-22 (1972).
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physical abuse or neglect.5 0 Moreover, there is a positive duty to
provide a dependent child with "necessaries," such as food, cloth-
ing, and shelter.51 To the extent of this basic support obligation,
parenting expenses should be characterized as involuntary and de-
ductible from gross income.5 2 This is so because there is no soci-
etally acceptable means of determining whether, in the absence of
legal or social constraints, a given taxpayer would voluntarily con-
tinue to provide support, rather than abandon or neglect, his or
her child.5 8
The amount of forced consumption inherent in parenting ex-
penses, and thus the proper level of the dependency deduction,
could be determined by reference to state-created parental support
obligations. This would initially create difficult enforcement
problems. In general, while state law requires parents to provide
"necessaries" to their children, this standard has not been pre-
cisely defined or interpreted. It does not tell us, for example, the
quantity and quality of shoes to which a dependent child is enti-
tled. Moreover, the definition of a "necessary" may depend on the
parent's wealth or standard of living." Of course, state legisla-
tures would soon amend their child support laws to eliminate the
problem of lack of precision. However, the cure would be worse
than the disease. New legislation predictably would be designed to
maximize the tax advantages of a state's citizens. Each state
would both clarify and expand the definition of necessaries mak-
ing most parenting expenditures legally required.5 5 Therefore, to
avoid initial administrative complexity and eventual tax avoid-
ance-motivated state legislation, the dependency deduction must
be determined from a federal perspective.
50 For a list of cases and other references dealing with the distribution of
power between parents and the state, and for a brief discussion of current law,
see Note, State Intrusion Into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1383 (1974).
11 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 55 (1971).
5s The current allocation of power and responsibility between parents and so-
ciety as a whole is but one step removed from parental autocracy. In contrast, a
society organized under the ideal of community would directly bear the cost of
raising children. In a communitarian-based society there would be no individual
parenting expenses to be taken into account.
" See text accompanying supra notes 40-43.
" 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 56 (1971).
55 For an account of one example of the predictable consequence of hinging
federal tax consequences on state law, see Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as
a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1, 13-19 (1980).
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From this national perspective a flat dependency deduction
equal to the cost of providing a minimally acceptable amount of
food, clothing, shelter, and other necessaries to each child seems
appropriate. Our society rejects absolute parental autocracy and
will intervene to force parents to provide an acceptable amount of
support to their children. If a child is abandoned, or its parents
are financially unable to provide necessaries, then direct govern-
mental care or assistance will be provided.5"
The amount of direct government support or government man-
dated support presently flowing to children cannot be accurately
calculated and certainly is not the same for each child. Neverthe-
less, our governing beliefs about equal treatment of all like situ-
ated individuals necessitate a dependency deduction premised on
the myth that an equal amount of basic subsistence is provided to
each American child either through direct federal assistance or
forced parental expenditure.57 Parents who are financially able
should be viewed as forced to expend an amount of money equal
to the basic support which society will provide to any child if it is
abandoned or if its parents become destitute. Accordingly, a mod-
est, flat dependency deduction appropriately acknowledges the ele-
ment of forced consumption inherent in parenting expenses and is
the best mechanism for adjusting tax burdens to reflect the actual
difference in market income earned by parents and nonparents.
II
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE IMPUTED INCOME FROM SELF-
PERFORMED HOUSEHOLD AND CHILDCARE SERVICES
A. The Relationship Between Rate Structures and Imputed
Income
The present income tax divides taxpayers into three filing cate-
gories based on family responsibilities: (1) married individuals; (2)
heads of households; (3) unmarried individuals other than heads
of households. 58 Underlying these separate rate structures is an
" For a brief catalog of government income transfer programs affecting chil-
dren, see R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 219-21 (1978).
'" Without this myth, every consideration of the proper level of the depen-
dency deduction would require an investigation of actual family sharing prac-
tices. Instead, exemption levels are based on the total income received by the
family. Appropriate intra-family allocation is assumed. See, e.g., 1 U.S. DEPrT OF
THE TREASURY, supra note 14, at 5-6.
" See supra notes 2-4.
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implicit judgment about the fair relative tax burden to be born by
members of each class. This same judgment could be made ex-
plicit using a single rate structure.5 9 For example, assume a tax
system with two rate structures: (1) a flat 10 percent tax on the
market income of unmarried individuals; (2) a flat 20 percent tax
on the market income of married individuals. Under this regime
unmarried individual A with a taxable income of $10,000 would
pay $1,000 in income tax, while married individual B with taxable
income of $10,000 would pay $2,000 in income tax. The same tax
results could be obtained under a single rate structure imposing
tax at the flat rate of 10 percent, so long as the tax system con-
tained a mechanism for increasing B's taxable income from
$10,000 to $20,000.
In this Article I assume that the underlying purpose of multiple
rate structures is to adjust indirectly the taxable incomes of mem-
bers of each filing class to reflect relevant differences in nonmone-
tary income. I argue that the relevant nonmonetary differences
are: (1) the positive income from self-performed household ser-
vices; and (2) the negative income from self-performed childcare
services. Further, I demonstrate how nonmonetary differences
should be taken into account under a tax system utilizing one rate
structure for all taxpayers. In so doing, I explain how the present
tax system discriminates against parents with dependent children.
B. The Imputed Income from Self-Performed Household
Services
Taxpayers receive a large amount of imputed income6" from
self-performed services. For example, taxpayer A may clean A's
own house, or A may hire a housekeeper at a cost of $40 per
week. By doing A's own cleaning, taxpayer A receives $40 of im-
puted income. Indeed, every productive act done for oneself pro-
duces imputed economic income. Thus, an individual realizes im-
59 McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 24, 1624. Cf. Coven, The Decline and
Fall of Taxable Income, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1538-55 (1981) (advocating
single filing and explicit deductions from gross income to reflect relevant differ-
ences flowing from family and employment responsibilities).
" "Imputed income may be defined ... as a flow of satisfactions from durable
goods owned and used by the taxpayer, or from goods and services arising out of
personal exertions of the taxpayer on his own behalf." Marsh, The Taxation of
Imputed Income, 58 POL. SCI. Q. 514 (1943). Imputed income is distinguished
from other forms of income in kind because it does not result from an ordinary
market transaction.
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puted income from self-performed services such as answering the
phone, making the bed, balancing the checkbook, and so on.6"
While tax theorists agree that it is impractical to tax every item
of imputed income, there is considerable support for adjusting tax
burdens to reflect the imputed income realized by nonworking
spouses. 62 To appreciate the need for such adjustment let us com-
pare A and B, a two-worker married couple and C and D, a one-
worker married couple. 3 A and B each earn $10,000 annually
from full-time market employment. C earns $20,000 from full-
time market employment. D, C's spouse, does not hold market
employment. Instead, D works in the home producing goods and
services for consumption by C and D. While couple AB and
couple CD each have a total market income of $20,000, C and D
are economically better off than A and B. To have the same
amount of leisure time as couple CD, A and B must purchase
basic household services in the market. To have the same discre-
tionary purchasing power6 4 as does couple CD, A and B must
devote leisure time to household production. As a result, couple
CD will either have more leisure time or more money than couple
AB, and the value of this excess leisure or money equals the value
of the household services performed by D during the normal mar-
ket work period.
Unequal amounts of imputed income occur, however, even when
individuals devote like amounts of time to market employment.
For example, A may be an accomplished gardener who in A's
spare time grows substantially all of couple AB's vegetables. The
imputed income from A's services might equal or exceed the im-
puted income flowing from D's household production.65
"1 McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 24, at 1611.
" O'Kelley, supra note 8, at 759; Coven, supra note 59, at 1540-52; Gann,
supra note 55, at 30-31; Bittker, supra note 12 at 1425-26. But see McIntyre
and Oldman, supra note 24, at 1607-24.
03 The term "one-worker couple" refers to a family arrangement in which one
partner is employed in the market and the other is not. The terms "married" and
"spouse" may be interpreted broadly to refer to the status of two individuals of
the same or different sex who have chosen to intertwine their personal lives in a
more substantial way than mere roommates. On the possibility of designing a
sharer-status-neutral income tax, see O'Kelley, supra note 8, at 766-69.
" This hypothetical assumes no differences in preexisting wealth between
couples.
" It is tempting to ignore these differences on the theory that no substantial
disparities are in fact likely to occur. H. SIMONS, supra note 18, at 110-13.
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Therefore, in order to justify a tax on the excess imputed in-
come enjoyed by nonworking spouses it is necessary to explain
how other inequalities in imputed income from self-performed ser-
vices should be treated.66 Moreover, implementing a tax on im-
puted income requires the existence of an effective, administra-
tively practicable counting mechanism. 7
The accretion concept of income, and the vision of society to
which it relates, provides an explanation of how imputed income
should be taken into account. Each working citizen owes an equal
amount of public service time to society, and it is the function of
the income tax to extract from taxable income the value of the
public service time owed.18 Spouses who work in the home are
providing valuable services which they and their spouse would oth-
erwise have to purchase. The value of the self-performed services
attributable to a household worker's extra nonemployment time
(the time which average market workers devote to their job) must
be included in gross income so that the value of the household
worker's public service time may be extracted."
The accretion concept recognizes the autonomy of each citizen
and the voluntary nature of the cooperative venture for mutual
advantage which constitutes our society. Society has a claim to a
portion of the market or imputed income generated during the
normal market employment period only because the tax extracted
is a reasonable proxy for the equal public service time owed to
society by each citizen. However, each citizen remains entitled to
the imputed income from their private time-time outside of the
normal market work period. Accordingly, it is appropriate to tax
imputed income from household production during the normal
market work period, while ignoring differences in imputed income
attributable to private time.70
" 3 REPORT OF THE R OYAL COMM'N ON TAX'N 14-15 (Canada, 1966).
67 Valuation of imputed income from household services is generally consid-
ered administratively impracticable. McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 24, at
1613; Gann, supra note 55, at 37.
" See the discussion in supra, section I(C).
19 O'Kelley, supra note 8, at 762-63.
70 "The ability to pay" maxim lacks credibility as a tax policy maxim because
of the politically unfeasible solutions which can be predicated on it. Id. at 745.
The Haig-Simons definition of income also loses credibility when it seems to sug-
gest that every productive human act should be taxed. The accretion concept as
interpreted in this article avoids that difficulty by acknowledging the difference
between: (1) market employment and its equivalent (home production of
equivalent duration); and (2) imputed income from nonemployment time.
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Actual valuation of household work is unnecessary. Providers of
household services-for example, cooks, janitors, and childcare
providers-are among the lowest paid workers in society. Thus we
may assume that every nonworking spouse performs household
services which could otherwise be acquired in the market by pay-
ing the minimum wage. It is true that a wealthy taxpayer might
willingly pay his or her nonworking spouse a great deal more than
the minimum wage because of pleasing personal attributes or so-
cial connections. However, under the accretion concept the
amount of money a given taxpayer would pay to obtain a luxury
spouse is irrelevant. Instead, we are interested in determining the
value of -the basic household services which nonworking spouses
are presumed to perform. Nor are we concerned that a wealthy
nonworking spouse might hire servants to perform these chores.
This is so because each able-bodied adult citizen owes society an
equal amount of public service time. If a wealthy nonworking
spouse uses the normal work day for personal leisure, we should
impute to him or her an income from extra leisure time equal in
amount to the income from self-performed services voluntarily
foregone. 71
To illustrate how imputed income from household production
would be taxed under the accretion model let us make two simpli-
fying assumptions: (1) each adult taxpayer needs twenty hours per
week of household services such as grocery shopping, house clean-
ing, cooking, laundering, and mending clothes; (2) the minimum
wage law guarantees every full-time worker an annual income of
$7,000.72 Now let us consider again the appropriate tax treatment
of two-worker married couple AB and one-worker married couple
CD.7 1 Each couple has a total market income of $20,000. While
"' Another problem with the Haig-Simons definition is the proper treatment of
leisure. Leisure is a form of personal consumption. Defining income as all per-
sonal consumption plus accumulation means that leisure should be taxed. Yet
proposing a tax on the value of all time used for leisure would be ludicrous.
Henry Simons concluded that both imputed income from household services and
income from leisure could be ignored because a taxpayer realizes income from
one at the sacrifice of income from the other. H. SIMONs, supra note 18, at 52-
53, 110-13. Simons did not take into account the extra time for home production
and leisure attributable to nonworking spouses. Under the accretion concept de-
veloped in this article it is only the value of this extra nonemployment time
which must be taken into account.
"' The current minimum wage is $3.35 per hour. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1982).
A minimum-wage worker who works forty hours per week, fifty-two weeks per
year earns $6,968 annually.
78 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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A, B and C are employed full-time in the market, D is not. In-
stead D works 40 hours per week providing household services for
C and D. In order to measure the value of D's private production
time and, thus, extract the value of D's public service time, we
must attribute $7,000 of imputed income to D. This gives couple
CD $7,000 more taxable income than couple AB.
The implications of this method of taxing imputed income can
be illustrated by comparing the present and proposed tax treat-
ment of couples AB and CD from the foregoing hypothetical, and
E, an unmarried individual who earns $20,000 and has no depen-
dent children. 74
CHART I
PRESENT TAX TREATMENT
Taxpayer Gross Personal Two-Earner Taxable Tax
Income Exemption Deduction Income
AB $20,000 $2,000 $1,000 $17,000 $1,921
CD 20,000 2,000 0 18,000 2,101
E 20,000 1,000 0 19,000 2,945
CHART II
PROPOSED TAX TREATMENT
Taxpayer Market Imputed Taxable Tax
Income Income Income
AB $20,000 0 $20,000 $3,205
CD 20,000 $7,000 27,000 5,165
E 20,000 0 20,000 3,205
As Chart I illustrates, current law differentiates between child-
less one-worker and two-worker married couples only to the extent
of the deduction for two-earner married couples. This deduction is
limited to the lesser of: (1) 10 percent of the lower paid spouses
market income, or (2) $3,000. 75 Compared to any reasonable esti-
mate of the imputed income attributable to a nonworking spouse's
"I Chart I calculates the tax liability of couples AB and CD under I.R.C. §
I(a) (1984) and the tax liability of E under I.R.C. § 1(c). Chart II calculates tax
under the rates specified in I.R.C. § 1(c). The rates for 1984 are used without
adjustment for inflation under I.R.C. § 1 (f). The proposed tax treatment uses one
rate structure and explicit adjustments to reflect differences in time available for
leisure and home production.
" I.R.C. § 221.
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extra nonemployment time, this deduction is indeed meager.
Moreover, the two-earner deduction does not provide any relief to
single worker E relative to one-worker married couple CD, even
though the latter taxpaying unit is better off to the extent of the
nonworking spouse's imputed income. Even worse, as Chart I
shows, present law imposes a substantially heavier tax burden on
single individual E than on either chidless married couple. Again,
whatever our estimate of the imputed income realized by a non-
working spouse, this allocation of tax burdens is indefensible. As
Chart II shows, the tax burdens borne by childless single taxpay-
ers and childless two-worker couples should be substantially lower
than that borne by childless one-worker couples. Charts I and II
also show that present law discriminates against unmarried indi-
viduals without dependent children relative to married individuals
without dependent children.
The accretion concept gives us, then, an objectively justifiable
and administratively practicable mechanism to be used in deter-
mining the relative tax burdens of nonworking spouses and other
taxpayers without dependent children, whether married or single.
However, in order to construct a coherent model for allocating tax
burdens among taxpayers with different family situations, we
must also understand the proper tax treatment of taxpayers with
childcare responsibilities.
C. Children as Negative Income
Self-performed childcare services can be viewed as a source of
imputed income. For example, a parent might hire a housekeeper
to perform required services such as babysitting, laundering, gro-
cery shopping, and cooking. Alternatively a parent may self-per-
form these services. By so doing, the parent saves an amount of
money equal to the market cost of purchasing required services in
the market. 76 However, viewing self-performed childcare services
as positive imputed income overlooks the forced consumption ex-
ception to the accretion definition and the relationship of children,
parents and the state. Society requires all parents to provide basic
services to their children. Moreover, society does not compensate
parents for childcare services performed. To be consistent with the
forced consumption doctrine, we cannot assume that all parents
receive personal satisfaction from performing childcare services
76 McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 24, at 1614-15.
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equal to the value of time given up.7 Nor can self-performed
childcare services be viewed as voluntary. While many parents
would continue to provide adequate childcare to their children
under a system of parental autocracy, there are also parents who
would neglect, abandon, or kill their children if not deterred by
legal sanctions. Accordingly, self-performed childcare services
must be viewed as producing negative income, the value of which
is fully deductible in calculating taxable income.
To illustrate the concept of negative income from parenting, let
us compare C and D, a one-worker married couple without depen-
dent children7 8 and F and G, a one-worker married couple with
one preschool-age dependent child. C and F earn $20,000 annu-
ally from full-time market employment. D and G are not em-
ployed in the market. Instead, each works in the home producing
goods and services for family consumption. Couple CD is econom-
ically better off than couple FG to the extent of FG's forced ex-
penditures of time and money for childcare.
Part I of this Article demonstrated that a flat dependency de-
duction adequately adjusts tax burdens to reflect out-of-pocket
parenting expenses incurred to provide children with basic physi-
cal goods such as food, clothing, and shelter. While necessaries
can be provided for a modest amount of money, childcare and re-
lated services require a substantial amount of a parent's time.
Moreover, younger children cannot be left unattended at any
hour. It is this requirement of full-time supervision which allows
us to make certain simplifying assumptions about the amount of
negative income inherent in the childcare services performed by
nonworking spouse G.
Let us assume that parents may satisfy their obligations to su-
pervise preschool-age children either by self-performance or by
market purchases of required supervision services. Further let us
posit that acceptable childcare can be purchased from individuals
who will not charge for the eight hours of supervisory time cover-
ing the period when chidren are sleeping. Under these assump-
tions, parental supervision of preschool- and school-age children is
required sixteen hours a day, seven days a week. Acquiring these
services at the minimum wage would cost $19,510.40.79
77 See discussion supra, section I(D)(I).
76 Couple CD is the subject of earlier consideration. See supra, section II(B).
T' Based on a minimum wage of $3.35 per hour with no additional pay for
overtime.
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However, parents who self-perform 112 hours of required child-
care services weekly do not realize a negative income of
$19,510.40 because forced supervisory time can also be used in
ways productive of positive imputed income. For example, while a
young child is napping, a parent must remain on duty in case of
fire or other emergency. However, this time can also be spent do-
ing household chores which are exclusively for the parent's bene-
fit. To the extent that required supervisory time is productive of
imputed income to the parent, negative income should not be
imputed.
Comparing nonworking spouses D and G illustrates this point.
During normal market employment time G's childcare responsibil-
ities prevent G from producing as many household services for
consumption by couple FG as D can produce for consumption by
couple CD. Instead, a portion of normal market employment time
goes to production of goods and services needed by couple FG's
child and to its required supervision. On the other hand, couple
FG realizes a positive amount of imputed income from self-per-
formed services in comparison to the imputed income of a two-
worker couple. Accordingly G has positive imputed income from
household production during the normal market employment pe-
riod in an amount less than $7000 but more than zero. For illus-
trative purposes, let us assume that nonworking spouses who self-
perform all household services and all supervision of preschool-age
children realize $3000 in imputed income during the normal mar-
ket employment period.
It is also clear that couple FG experiences substantial forced
reductions in the value of their nonemployment time as a result of
their state-mandated, full-time childcare obligations. Again for
purposes of illustration, let us posit that self-performed care of
preschool-age children produces $8,000 of negative income during
the nonemployment time that nonparents may devote to leisure or
home production for their own benefit.
The foregoing analysis produces strikingly different relative tax
burdens among one-worker married couples with and without pre-
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school-age children than does present law. Chart III calculates the
income tax bill of couple CD and couple FG under present law.80
CHART III
PRESENT TAX TREATMENT
Taxpayer Market Personal Dependency Taxable Tax
Income Exemption Deduction Income Liability
CD $20,000 $2,000 0 $18,000 $2,691
FG 20,000 2,000 $1,000 17,000 2,461
Chart IV determines the tax liability of Couple CD and Couple
FG under the imputed income method.8
CHART IV
PROPOSED TAX TREATMENT
Taxpayer Market Positive Negative Dependent Taxable Tax
Income Imputed Imputed Deduction Income Liability
Income Income
CD $20,000 $7,000 0 0 $27,000 $5,165
FG 20,000 3,000 $8,000 $1,000 14,000 , 1,801
As Chart III shows, present law differentiates between one-
worker married couples on the basis of parenting responsibilities
only by allowing a modest dependency deduction. As Chart IV
shows, recognizing the negative income from childcare obligations
produces a dramatic reduction in the relative tax burdens of par-
ents with childcare responsibilities.
For illustrative purposes hypotheticals in this Article focus on
parents with preschool-age children, and assume that preschool-
age children require full-time parental supervision which produces
stipulated amounts of imputed negative income. The suggested ap-
proach might yield different negative income figures for older chil-
dren. For example it might be reasonable to assume that school-
age children attend class during the normal market work period.
Accordingly nonworking spouses with dependent school-age
chidren might be treated as experiencing a lesser reduction in im-
SO The calculations in Chart III assume no other deductions or items of in-
come than those shown. Tax liability is calculated under I.R.C. § l(c) (1984)
using 1984 rates.
s, The calculations in Chart IV assume no other deductions or items of in-
come than those shown. Tax liability is calculated under a hypothetical single
rate structure income tax using the 1984 rates shown in I.R.C. § l(c) (1984).
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puted income from household services self-performed during the
normal market work period than is experienced by nonworking
spouses with preschool-age children. Moreover, the required su-
pervision and care of older chidren may produce a lesser amount
of imputed negative income during nonemployment time. Empiri-
cal study might also indicate a need to vary tax burdens to reflect
differences in negative income based on the number of dependent
children for whom a taxpayer is responsible. In contrast to the
present tax law, the suggested approach would easily accommo-
date such precise, incremental adjustments in the tax burdens of
parents relative to both other parents and nonparents.
D. Childcare Services Necessary for Gainful Employment
Single parents and two-worker married parents must either in-
cur out-of-pocket childcare expenses or forego market employ-
ment in order to care for their children.82 Prior to 1954 these
childcare expenses were classified as nondeductible personal, liv-
ing, or family expenses.83 Since 1954 the Internal Revenue Code
has provided a mechanism to lessen the tax burden of some work-
ing parents on account of their employment-related childcare ex-
penses.84 The present tax relief provision is a modest tax credit.8 '
In effect, present law treats these childcare expenses as in part
deductible business expenses and in part nondeductible personal,
living, or family expenses. However, the principle of neutrality be-
tween market and home production inherent in the accretion con-
cept of income86 requires both full deductibility of employment-
related childcare expenses and taxation of imputed income real-
8 Parents in the hypotheticals in this section are assumed to have preschool-
age dependent children requiring full-time supervision.
8 Smith v. Comm'r, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939).
8 2 B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GiTS $ 37.1.1
(1981). For a list of references on this subject see W. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 719 (3d ed. 1985).
as I.R.C. § 21 (1984) allows a tax credit equal to the "applicable percentage"
of employment-related expenses. The applicable percentage is 30 percent reduced
(but not below 20 percent) by I percentage point for each $2,000 by which the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income exceeds $10,000. The applicable percentage is
multiplied by the smaller of: (1) employment-related expenses; or (2) the earned
income of a single taxpayer, or, if the taxpayer is a married couple, the earned
income of the lower paid spouse. The maximum credit available for expenses
incurred for the care of one child is $720.
"' It is a central tenet of the accretion concept that the income tax should
treat gain the same whatever its source. Andrews, supra note 31, at 320-25.
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ized by nonworking spouses during the normal market work
period.
To the extent possible a tax should not affect individual choices
between leisure and work, or among different types of work. Thus,
a well-designed income tax would be neutral as to the choice be-
tween market and home production. 7 In fact present law discrim-
inates in favor of self-performed childcare services and against
market employment. To illustrate this point, consider individual
X, a nonworking spouse who presently self-performs all childcare
services required by her dependent preschool-age child during the
normal market work period. X is offered market employment at
an annual wage of $7,000. In order to perform this job, X must
purchase childcare services at an annual cost of $4,000. Let us
assume that X's income from the normal market employment pe-
riod is subject to tax at the flat rate of 30 percent. 88 Chart V
shows X's after-tax income from the normal market employment
period under five alternative scenarios: (1) X chooses home pro-
duction under an income tax which does not tax the resulting im-
puted income;"' (2) X chooses home production under an income
tax which does tax the resulting imputed income; (3) X accepts
market employment under an income tax allowing no credit or
deduction for employment-related childcare expenses; (4) X ac-
cepts market employment under an income tax containing I.R.C.
§ 21; (5) X accepts market employment under an income tax al-
lowing full deductibility of employment-related childcare
expenses.
X must choose between home production generating net pretax
imputed income of $3,000 and market employment which will
produce a net pretax monetary income of $3,000. The income tax
is neutral if the after-tax rewards available to X from either
choice have the same relative value to X as the pretax rewards.' 0
Present law, as depicted in lines 1 and 4 of Chart V, discriminates
in favor of home production because imputed income from home
production is not taxed. Comparing the net after-tax rewards for
alternatives 1 and 5 shows that making childcare expenses fully
7 Rosen, Is It Time to Abandon Joint Filing?, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 423, 426-27
(1977); Gann, supra note 55, at 39 n.131.
In this hypothetical we are ignoring the income of X's spouse and X's im-
puted negative income from nonmarket employment time.
89 The net imputed income is deemed to be $3,000. See supra notes 79-80 and
accompanying text.
90 Idiosyncratic valuations are irrelevant for tax purposes.
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deductible would not eliminate the present discrimination against
market production. However, as illustrated by comparing alterna-
CHART V
X's AFrER-TAX INCOME
Market Imputed Taxable Income Out-of-Pocket Net After-Tax
Income Income-a Income Tax Childcare Imputed or
_ Liability-c Expenses Market Income
1 0 $3,000 0 0 0 $3,000
2 0 3,000 $3,000 $ 900 0 2,100
3 $7,000 0 $7,000 2,100 0 900
4 7,000 0 7,000 1,380-d $4,000 1,620
5 7,000 0 3,000-b 900 4,000 2,100
I. X chooses home production; imputed income not taxed.
2. X chooses home production; imputed income taxed.
3. X chooses.market production; childcare expenses not deductible.
4. X chooses market production; § 21 in effect.
5. X chooses market prodution; childcare expenses fully deductible.
a. Posited value of home production by nonworking spouse with preschool-
age child.
b. $7,000 market income less out-of-pocket childcare expenses.
c. 30 percent of taxable income.
d. 30 percent of taxable income less I.R.C. § 21 credit.
tives 2 and 5, the relative value of pretax income from home and
market production is unchanged by an income tax which both
taxes the imputed income arising from household production by
nonworking spouses during the normal market employment period
and treats employment-related childcare expenses as fully
deductible. 91
E. Fair Relative Tax Burdens Under a Single Rate Structure:
A Critique of Current Law
An income tax can differentiate between taxpayers with the
same market income but different family responsibilities: (1) by
S Full deductibility of childcare expenses alone would make the income tax
neutral as between one-worker parents and two-worker parents only if self-per-
formed childcare services both created positive imputed income and precluded
the nonworking spouse from realizing imputed income from household produc-
tion. I suggest, however, that self-performed childcare is negative income. In
other words it reduces the amount of positive income from household production
that the nonworking spouse could otherwise realize. Viewed in this fashion, the
nonworking spouse is presently allowed to exclude from gross income more than
the full value of self-performed childcare services.
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making explicit adjustments to taxable income to reflect relevant
differences in nonmonetary income; (2) by using multiple rate
structures to implicitly accomplish the same adjustments; or (3)
through some combination of multiple rate structures and explicit
adjustments. The present income tax uses the third approach.
The preceding parts of this Article develop a theory of how rel-
ative tax burdens could be explicitly adjusted under a single rate
structure system. If the foregoing analysis is correct, then the pre-
sent income tax is flawed to the extent that it fails to produce
relative tax burdens which are consistent with this theory. There-
fore, let us now compare the full range of tax burdens resulting
under present law and under the approach advocated in this
Article.
Chart VI illustrates the tax treatment under present law of the
following six taxpaying units: (1) a single taxpayer with no depen-
dents; (2) a single taxpayer with one dependent preschool-age
child; (3) a one-worker married couple with no dependents; (4) a
one-worker married couple with one preschool-age dependent
child; (5) a two-worker married couple with no dependents; and
(6) a two-worker married couple with one dependent child. Single
parents and two-worker married parents are assumed to spend
$3,000 annually for employment-related childcare services.
CHART VI
RELATIVE TAX BURDENS UNDER PRESENT LAW
Taxpayer Unit/
No. of Workers Personal
in Unit/No. of and
Dependent Market Dependent § 221 Taxable Tax
Children Income Exemption Deduction-a Income Liability-e
Single/I/0 $20,000 $1,000 0 $19,000 $2,945(b)
Single/1/i 20,000 2,000 0 18,000 1,894(c)
Couple/I/0 20,000 2,000 0 18,000 2,101 (d)
Couple/I / I 20,000 3,000 0 17,000 1,321 (d)
Couple/2/0 20,000 2,000 $1,000 17,000 1,921 (d)
Couple/2/1 20,000 3,000 1,000 16,000 1,141 (d)
a. Assumes each worker earns $10,000 annually.
b. Calculated under I.R.C. § l(c) as in effet for 1984.
c. Calculated under I.R.C. § l(b) as in effect for 1984.
d. Calculated under I.R.C. § 1(a) as in effect for 1984.
e. Tax credit calculated under I.R.S. $21.
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Chart VII depicts the tax treatment of these same hypothetical
taxpayers under the approach advocated in this Article. Chart VII
imputes positive and negative income on the following basis:
$7,000 imputed positive income from the normal market employ-
ment period to nonworking spouse without children; 92 $3,000 im-
puted positive income from the normal market employment period
to nonworking spouse with preschool-age child; 93 and $8,000 im-
puted negative income from childcare responsibilities during
nonemployment time to taxpaying units with a dependent pre-
school-age chid.94 Chart VII assumes a dependency deduction of
$1,000 and a single rate structure identical to that applicable to
unmarried individuals under present law.
CHART VII
RELATIVE TAX BURDENS UNDER SUGGESTED APPROACH
Taxpayer
Unit/No. of
Workers in
Unit/No. of Net Negative
Dependent Market Imputed Imputed Dependent Childcare Taxable Tax
Children Income Income Income Deductions Expense Income-a Liability-b
Single/I/O $20,000 0 0 0 0 $20,000 $3,205
Single/I / 1 20,000 0 $8,000 $1,000 $3,000 8,000 760
Couple/I/0 20,000 $7,000 0 0 0 27,000 5,165
Couple/I / 1 20,000 3,000 8,000 1,000 0 20,000 3,205
Couple/2/0 20,000 0 0 0 0 20,000 3,205
Couple/2/I 20,0001 0 8,000 1 ,000 3,000 8,000 760
a. Assumes no other deductions
b. Calculated under I.R.C. § l(c) as in effect for 1984.
Chart VI shows that within the three major classes of taxpay-
ers, single persons, one-worker married couples, and two-worker
married couples, present law produces only a slightly lesser tax
burden for taxpayers with dependent children than their childless
counterparts. In contrast, as illustrated in Chart VII, the tax bur-
den of taxpayers with dependent children should be substantially
less than the tax burden of members of the same taxpayer class
who do not have dependent children but are otherwise like
situated.
An equally striking flaw in present law is its treatment of single
taxpayers relative to married taxpayers. Under the approach ad-
92 See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
:3 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
4 Id.
OREGON LAW REVIEW
vocated in this Article, a single taxpayer without dependent chil-
dren bears a lesser tax burden than a one-worker married couple
without dependent children. This treatment is correct because the
one-worker couple realizes imputed income from the household
services performed by the nonworking spouse during the normal
market employment period. 95 However, as Chart VI shows, under
current law the single taxpayer without dependent children pays
substantially more income tax than the one-worker couple without
dependent chidren.
The same pattern holds true when we compare the tax burdens
of parents. Under the suggested approach, as illustrated in Chart
VII, the lowest tax burden should be borne by single parents and
two-worker married parents. Each type of taxpayer realizes no
positive imputed income from self-performed household services
during the normal market employment period, requires like
amounts of employment-related childcare services, and exper-
iences like amounts of negative income from childcare responsibil-
ities during nonemployment time. Nonetheless, present law im-
poses a heavier tax burden on single parents than on two-worker
married parents and imposes a similar tax burden on single par-
ents and one-worker married parents.
This perplexing assignment of tax burdens under present law
can be explained in a manner which both affirms the appropriate-
ness of the positive and negative income approach and highlights
the need for a unifying theory. First compare line one of Chart VI
and line one of Chart VII. The tax burden for a single taxpayer
without dependent chidren is similar under present law and the
suggested approach. Next compare line four of Chart VI and line
four of Chart VII. The tax burden for a one-worker married
couple with dependent children is similar under present law and
the suggested approach. Thus, present law and the suggested ap-
proach make the same judgment about the fair relative tax bur-
dens of single taxpayers without dependent children and a married
one-worker couple with dependent children. Moreover, these judg-
ments are consistent with the view that one-worker married tax-
payers with dependent children should pay substantially less tax
than single taxpayers because of the substantial net imputed nega-
tive income generated by parenting."
" See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
' But see McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 24, at 1620.
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Present law could be explained then as evolving from an initial
assumption that all taxpayers fall into one of two stereotypical
groups, single taxpayers with no children and one-worker married
taxpayers with dependent children. The initial decision to create a
rate differential in favor of married individuals necessarily repre-
sented an implicit judgment about the amount of net negative in-
come experienced by these taxpayers relative to single individu-
als.97 While Congress has since recognized the legitimate
complaints of single parents,98 single individuals generally,99 and
two-worker married couples, 100 it has done so in an ad hoc fash-
ion, constrained by the revenue consequences of substantial relief
to the complaining group, the political danger inherent in explic-
itly raising the taxes of the unfairly advantaged groups, and the
lack of a coherent theory of how tax burdens should be adjusted
to reflect family and household responsibilities.
11 Prior to 1948 individuals were required to pay tax on their own income
under a single rate structure applicable to all taxpayers. Poe v. Seaborn, 282
U.S. 101 (1930) determined that for federal tax purposes spouses in community
property states could each report one-half of the community income. Because of
this ruling and graduated rates, one-worker married couples in community prop-
erty states paid less income tax than one-worker married couples having the
same market income but residing in common law states. In 1948 Congress ex-
tended income-splitting privileges to all married couples with respect to a
couple's total joint income. As a result, a one-worker married couple paid sub-
stantially less tax than a single taxpayer with the same taxable income. Bittker,
supra note 12, at 1404-16.
1 Income-splitting was generally viewed as a tax allowance for family respon-
sibilities. However, its benefits were not available to single parents. In 1951, in
response to public complaints, Congress enacted a special head-of-household rate
structure under which single parents were taxed less heavily than unmarried in-
dividuals without family responsibiliites. However, the tax burden of single par-
ents remained higher than that of married couples (with or without dependent
children) having the same taxable income. Bittker, supra note 12, at 1417-18.
" The income-splitting provision was widely viewed as too favorable to mar-
ried couples relative to childless unmarried individuals.
In 1969 Congress created separate rate structures for married couples filing
jointly, married couples filing separately, and unmarried individuals. Under these
rate structures the tax paid by an unmarried individual could not exceed by more
than 20 percent the tax paid by a married couple having the same taxable in-
come. Gann, supra note 55, at 20-21; McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 24,at
1588; Bittker, supra note 12, at 1428-29.
100 In 1981 Congress enacted I.R.C. § 221 (1982) to alleviate the marriage tax
penalty-the extra tax paid by two-worker married couples under I.R.C. § l(a)
(rates for married individuals filing jointly) compared to the total tax which
would be due if the income of each spouse were separately taxed under I.R.C. §
(l)(c) (rates for unmarried individuals). S. REP. No. 797, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
29-33, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 136-40.
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Proceeding in this fashion Congress and tax policy scholars
have not developed a coherent theory of the tax consequences
flowing from differing family responsibilities. This Article provides
a theoretical basis for reforming the present system to remove the
discrimination against parents, and, more generally, to take ac-
count of the relevant differences in imputed income among tax-
payers with similar market incomes, but dissimilar family
responsibilities.
III
CLOSING THOUGHTS
Boris Bittker in his classic article on taxation and the family
concluded that there was no possible solution to the problems
presented which did not favor one category of taxpayers over
others with equally plausible claims to tax preference. 101 To be
sure, determining the relative tax burdens of taxpayers with iden-
tical market incomes but different family responsibilities requires
normative judgments about the purpose of the income tax and the
relative rights and duties of parents and the state. However, the
problem is not insoluble. This Article demonstrates that the domi-
nant accretion concept of income, when properly interpreted, pro-
duces an objectively justifiable allocation of tax burdens between
parents and nonparents.
The accretion concept of income is based on the view that citi-
zens are obligated to contribute equal amounts of public service
time to society. Adjusting tax burdens to reflect the negative in-
come from parenting is consistent with both the accretion ideal
and social reality. If no one raised children the species would dis-
appear in short order. Thus, parents perform a service to society
as a whole when they procreate and subsequently care for their
children. 10 Allowing a deduction for the negative income from
parenting recognizes that parents have already contributed sub-
stantial public service time to society.
The negative income concept also has implications for the de-
sign and public perception of federal welfare programs. An unem-
101 Bittker, supra note 12, at 1442-44, 1463.
102 For a society troubled by overpopulation, not every birth would represent a
contribution to society. Nonetheless, society would still require parents of ex-
isting children to provide necessary childcare. Thus, it would be inappropriate to
decrease the childcare related deductions available to parents of existing children
in order to discourage excessive additional births.
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ployed parent with preschool-age children who self-performs re-
quired childcare services realizes substantial amounts of negative
income. Therefore, begrudgingly given welfare assistance should
be replaced with a refundable tax credit based on the negative
income experienced by such parent.
The accretion and negative income concepts provide a princi-
pled basis for recognizing the important public service rendered
by parents. Moreover these concepts provide an objectively justifi-
able basis for adjusting tax burdens between parents and
nonparents to reflect relevant differences in market and
nonmarket childcare expenses.

